Conceptually, Russia has existed since the 9th Century. Meanwhile, Russia as an expansionist state has existed since the 13th Century. Authoritarian at heart, and expansionist by habit is the famous claim by Andrei P. Tysgankov, and that very habit of Russian expansionism that has been lingering ever since the early days on the North European Plain has been dominated by geography every step of the way, and would later be accompanied by hubris, ethno-territorial federalism and nationalism.
The Russian expansionism that we are all too familiar with today is looked at through a lens that could not be more different to the one used when assessing Russia’s long struggle into empire that began 800 years ago. In my brief 23 years on this planet, Russia has bombed Grozny into the ground, went to war with Georgia, annexed Crimea and invaded Ukraine. This aggression has been consistent with the epoch predating myself, and the analysis has swung from one end of the spectrum to the other. In 2020, I was told by my professors that attitudes towards Russian expansionism are often just ‘Russophobic’ bias and the fact that the UK spends more on its military should be as equally pronounced. Merely two years later and it seems as though it’s no longer causal proposition linking Russia’s expansionism to authoritarian culture, so where did that change happen?
Kievan Rus and the Mongols
Heading back to the 9th Century, and the European battlefield was a Hobbesian international system where survival was only achieved through expansion. Russia, or Kievan Rus- the East Slavic Christian civilisation that arose in 9th Century Kiev, found that out the hard way. They were chased out of Kiev by the Mongols, and headed North-East to what was known as the Grand Principality of Muscovy ( better known as Moscow) which was now a Russian speaking, but crucially, flat plain of land in the midst of the Eastern European shark tank. It was not just the Mongols that provided early insecurity for the defenceless and vulnerable Muscovy, which had zero geographical defensive barriers, as Sweden and the commonwealths of Lithuania and Poland were violent players in this kill-or-be-killed environment. Ivan the Great chose to kill.
In a competitive system, states either emulate the practices of successful rivals or maximise their own comparative advantage, and as the borderless and wide open Muscovy had no advantages, Ivan emulated the very same expansionist strategy that the Mongols had used a few centuries prior. Slowly, Moscow began to take shape as territory was penetrated, either through confiscation ( as seen in Lithuania in 1477) or diplomacy ( witnessed in Rostov in 1474). The local aristocracy would be co-opted, with land redistributed to nobles who served the Tsar. This slow and patient process would take generations to eliminate local independence, but it was a start.
The moderate expansions made under Ivan III helped to form a protective ring around Moscow, which would then be accelerated by his grandson, Ivan IV (the Terrible). After becoming the first Tsar in 1547, Russia would expand southwards and northwards towards the Urals and the Caspian Sea respectively, acquiring geographical barriers to prevent invasion such as the Black Sea and Caucasus Mountains as the territory now extended toward the Arctic Circle. To further dissuade potential attackers, a military base was built in the Chechen region of the Caucasus which would begin Chechnya’s role as the vital strategic republic that still benefits Russia greatly to this day. At last, Russia had its buffer zones and its vast land complimented with steep mountains and unnavigable waters meaning that anyone foolish enough to invade would not only have to deal with the treacherous conditions but also unsustainably long supply lines. Despite this, the expansionist doctrine would not stop there as there was plenty more land to seize and more geographical barriers to acquire in order to overcome the terrible strategic hand Russia had originally been dealt.
Peter pivots West
The further Russia expanded outwards, the more rivals they would encounter as security was never lasting amid a never ending wave of potential expanding commonwealths all vying to be the biggest power. The systemic pressure to expand as a means for survival dominated the actions of Ivan III and Ivan IV. However by 1721, Peter the Great had different ideas for the newly established Russian Empire. 18th Century Russia had to be the provocateurs, as the physically imposing Peter expanded West to become a European power by swallowing Ukraine and the Baltic States, as well as winning back some of the territories that had been lost to Sweden and Poland in the century prior.
The strategy had shifted, Russia was no longer content with just surviving, it wanted revenge on the geographical inheritance it was given and wanted to go as far as India, as Peter allegedly advised his descendants to pursue wars in Turkey and Persia. Russia sought the warm waters that would aid the flow of trade and allow for fleets to command the globe as a naval power, a stark contrast from the reality of the frozen ports with no ocean access that Russia is impeded with.
The rules of the game change
It was the neo-realist theory that posited that states have to compete to be secure which dominated geopolitics and led to Russia’s acquisition of land that turned it into the global player it remains today. While the likes of America, China and Britain all have their own expansionist history as they consolidated territories during the formative years of their respective national histories, none are viewed quite like Russia. Geography again, may help explain this. While 75% of Russian territory is situated in Asia, it has never been an Asian power and the fact that only 25% of the Russian population lives in that aforementioned territory is one reason why. Russia has always been a European power, but has sat on the periphery of Europe for quite some time which could explain why the continent quickly became wary of the great empire and as civilisations grew, Russia’s territorial depth seemed unnecessary. Due to the size of Russia it doesn’t benefit from the interconnectedness of Western Europe where the rivers do not meet which forms the many natural borders which contributes to a free flow of ideas, trade and culture. Russia on the other hand, is plagued with isolating frozen wastelands that attributed to contact with Western Europe being comparatively late, occurring in the 18th Century and thus beginning the ‘outsider’ status that would attribute to negative attitudes towards Russian expansionism. Few Europeans have visited Russia and even fewer speak the difficult language, and its enormous size in contrast to the smaller European nation states have meant it had unsettled the continent. By the 19th Century, Western Europe had modernised, liberalised and democratised which then made Russia’s backwardness and seemingly selfish territory size appear incompatible with the contemporary European culture. The views held by Western Europeans during this time would have been eerily similar to the way that Putin’s Russia was being viewed prior to the invasion of Ukraine.
Russia’s original expansionism was born out of necessity. Had it not been for the actions of Ivan III, Ivan IV and Peter I we could be speaking about Poland being the largest country in Europe. The Russian journey into becoming a multinational empire happened at a time without modern nationalism, and were left behind by the modernisation of Western Europe who had changed the rules of empire, and expected Russia to fall in line. As a multinational empire coming into contact with a powerful European state system, Russia was once again at a crossroads- cede territory and become a member of the system or remain the villainous authoritarian power that would need to maintain its territories due to the anxiety caused by that very system. Russia had survived living in the worlds most dangerous neighbourhood and was set up to be expansionist ever since it arrived on the defenceless plains in Eurasia, but by the time it had reached the West, they were already incompatible with the direction the continent was moving in, and by not fitting in, were doomed to become a militaristic state which would be on a collision course with the rest of Europe.
The aftermath of the Soviet Union
By 1922, the Russian territory now stretched from the borders of Berlin to Afghanistan, as the Soviet Union was founded with the Treaty of the Union. In an attempt to conglomerate 15 nation states into a republic, with multiple ethnic identities, ethno-territorial federalism was the pragmatic compromise as each ethnic group would have its own republic. The union was created paradoxically, as it contradicted the Bolshevik view of nationalism in order to become a union. Future integration was anticipated due to the expectation of nations becoming drawn together through socialism. Republics were given cosmetic symbols of statehood such as state symbols, however all power, policy and economic responsibility lay with the central authorities. The Soviet Union and seven other satellite states ( Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania) would go on to form the Warsaw Pact which was a counterweight to NATO. Within 15 years of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, every single member state of the Warsaw Pact would go on to become a member of the European Union and/or NATO – bar Russia. A new motive for Russian expansionism was born- protect the sphere of influence.
Russia will never be an empire again. When Russia invaded Afghanistan in 1979, it wasn’t to help spread ideology to the Afghan people but rather benefit from the warm waters of the Indian Ocean and prevent its rivals from occupying the space. Similarly, Putin’s intervention in Syria back in 2011 can be somewhat explained by protecting Russia’s naval presence in Tartus. Geography is once again dictating Russian foreign policy just like it did 800 years ago, only this time there is the perceived encroachment of Western Europe and millions of ethnic Russians spread across Eastern Europe acting as levers for future conflict.
Back in 2016, former US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta stated that Vladimir Putin’s main interest is to restore the Soviet Union. Panetta may have been referring to Putin’s 2005 remarks where he referred to the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century. While Putin was broadly speaking about the economic hardships that accompanied the union’s collapse, and not his desire to recreate it, he may also have been referring to the geographical catastrophe that followed, as 15 republics would be broken up into nation states and separated by the defensive barriers that the Russians fought so hard to acquire.
The split of the former Soviet Union posed a million logistical problems, but one has present day implications. What will happen to the large Russian minorities strategically placed in other republics by Joseph Stalin?
Frozen conflicts to combat NATO encroachment
Russian expansionism since the collapse of the Soviet Union has been difficult. Being carefully monitored by the West who is creating allies closer and closer to the Russian border, but still possessing certain levers that can be activated to reclaim lost territory, help gain new geographical barriers and stop the West from diminishing Russia’s sphere of influence.
Joseph Stalin’s deliberately drew the borders of former republics such as Tajikistan to ensure it would have a strong Russian minority, and deported Chechen and Ingush populations to the Caucasus to be closer to Central Asia to ensure a lasting Russian presence in the region. This strategy would create frozen conflicts as an indirect lever of control rather than the direct subordination of the former Soviet Union, which is now preferred by Russia, who will justify its expansionism through a Kremlin passed law to protect all ethnic Russians. This has been evident with Russia’s actions towards Ukraine from annexing Crimea to its full fledged invasion earlier this year. Back in 2014, Putin was able to use this framework to justify the annexation of Crimea as it was home to many Russian speaking Ukrainians who were at risk due to the anti-Russian factions (which included pro-fascists) that took over the government following the overthrow of President Yanukovych who sided with Moscow after coming close a key trade deal with the EU. Importantly, Crimea is home to Russia’s only warm water port in Sevastopol which Putin feared would lose access too if Ukraine was to be on a path toward EU membership. Fast-forward to 2022, and Putin is citing the minority presence of the Azov Battalion in Ukraine’s military as a reason to invade.
If Russia is to secure Odessa, they would be able to use it as a staging post for another frozen conflict which could be activated in Moldova. Transnistria is a heavily pro-Russian region in Moldova which is surrounded by the Transylvanian Alps which would provide Russia with a very useful route into the Black Sea. Another frozen conflict for Russia is the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia which has had Russian troops stationed there since the 2008 conflict led to occupation, and Russia continue to recognise the independence of the two regions.
Unresolved conflicts are a key way for Russia to exert its influence, and by making separatist regions dependent on Russia for economic development they can retain power in a region that is slipping away from them. We have seen Russia acts as an arbiter between Armenia and Azerbaijan as part of the OSCE Minsk Group, continue to support separatists in Luhansk and Donetsk, while recognising Independence in Georgian regions. These strategic levers are valuable to Russia for geographical and diplomatic reasons, and combined with the control over energy pricing and the ability to turn the taps off in nations that depend on Russian energy, they can continue to pick fights in Europe even if expanding its borders can be considered a thing of the past.
Russia is due to become more isolated in Europe than ever before, and will look to pivot to Central Asia to repair the damage done by economic sanctions in Europe. While NATO and EU membership looms for Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, and the rest of Europe looks to America’s liquified natural gas to try and reduce its dependency on Russian energy, Russia will rely on indirect levers of control to retain influence in the region and its crucial pivot to China,which will be the focus of my next publication, could see the two use Central Asia as a playground to escape the European battlefield.
Luca Difato 12/08
Luca Difato 